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Introduction: the nature of influenza viruses 
Influenza A viruses are enveloped, single stranded RNA viruses in the family 
Orthomyxoviridae. They are further classified into subtypes based on the antigenic properties of 
the external glycoproteins hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). Sixteen antigenically 
different HAs (H1-H16) and 9 different NAs (N1-N9) have been recognized so far, and their 
combination designates the subtype of the virus. Influenza is the classic example of a 
genetically unstable virus and it undergoes antigenic “drift” and “shift”. Antigenic drift involves 
the gradual accumulation of small mutations in the virus genome, especially in the genes 
encoding the HA and/or NA. This may result in subtle antigenic changes, leading to decreased 
recognition of the virus by the immune system and thus a greater chance for an influenza 
epidemic. Antigenic shift is a much more dramatic antigenic change and it refers to the 
introduction of a virus of another HA and/or NA subtype. There are thought to be 2 main 
mechanisms through which such a shift is generated: the introduction of a novel virus from an 
animal reservoir, or genetic “reassortment”. The latter can occur when 2 different influenza 
viruses simultaneously infect the same host cells. The genome of an influenza virus is 
“segmented” – it comprises 8 single-stranded negative-sense RNAs – and the 8 gene segments 
of one virus can then mix and match with those of the other virus to form a new combination 
virus. But there are 254 possible new gene combinations and a shift will only result if the 
reassortment involves a change in the HA and/or NA proteins. When such a novel influenza 
virus subtype enters the human population, it can overcome the existing immunity and spread 
worldwide to cause a pandemic. 
Influenza A viruses infect humans and animals as diverse as pigs, horses, seals, ferrets 
and a variety of wild and domestic bird species. Research indicates that wild aquatic birds are 
the source of all influenza viruses in other species. Birds differ from mammals in that they are 
susceptible to influenza viruses belonging to any H or N subtype and that the virus replicates 
both in the respiratory and in the intestinal tract. Periodically, influenza viruses are introduced 
from wild birds to domestic species (chickens, turkeys, quail), in which there are 2 pathotypes of 
influenza: low pathogenic and highly pathogenic avian influenza. In contrast to the mild low 
pathogenic viruses, highly pathogenic viruses cause a generalized infection involving all vital 
organs with up to 100% mortality. The causative viruses have been restricted to subtypes H5 or 
H7, but not all H5 or H7 viruses are highly pathogenic. Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
viruses appear to arise in poultry as a result of mutations in the viral HA after the introduction of 
H5 or H7 low pathogenic viruses from wild birds. 
 
The pathogenesis and clinical signs of influenza are in fact remarkably similar in humans 
and in pigs. The virus replicates in epithelial cells of the entire respiratory tract, notably the nasal 
mucosa, trachea and lungs. The infection and disease are very transient, and virus excretion in 
nasal swabs and virus replication in the lungs last for 6-7 days at most. Though the virus does 
not replicate outside the respiratory tract, the disease is associated with a variety of systemic 
symptoms. Typical outbreaks of swine influenza (SI) are characterized by a rapid onset of high 
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fever, dullness, loss of appetite, labored abdominal breathing and coughing. The typical signs of 
human influenza include fever, chills, cough, headache, myalgia, malaise, anorexia and sore 
throat. Still, asymptomatic infections are common in both species, and pigs in particular become 
frequently infected with swine influenza viruses (SIVs) without showing clinical signs. Influenza 
viruses are potent inducers of inflammatory cytokines locally in the respiratory tract. Examples 
of such cytokines include the interferons, tumor necrosis factor-alpha, the interleukins-1 and -6, 
and several chemokines. It is now clear that these cytokines are important mediators of flu-like 
symptoms in pigs as well as in humans. But the same cytokines are most likely also responsible 
for the extremely rapid and solid immune response to influenza viruses. 
 
Compared to other influenza virus hosts, pigs are also closer to humans when it comes 
to the nature and origins of their influenza viruses, and the same virus subtypes - H1N1, H3N2 
and H1N2 – are circulating in humans and in swine. But while influenza viruses from humans 
and pigs frequently have a common origin, they are not 100% identical at the antigenic and 
genetic level. Also, the SIVs in Europe differ significantly in their antigenic and genetic make-up 
from those circulating in North America, and still other variants are circulating in various Asian 
countries. The predominant H1N1 SIVs in Europe, for example, are entirely of avian origin. They 
were introduced from wild ducks into the pig population in 1979 and are unrelated to the human 
H1N1 viruses causing seasonal influenza. Two types of H1N1 SIV, in contrast, are circulating in 
North America. The so-called “classical” H1N1 viruses have been present since the early 20th 
century and they probably emerged by transfer of the human 1918 pandemic virus to swine. 
These swine H1N1 viruses therefore have a similar origin as the seasonal human H1N1 viruses, 
but the latter viruses have shown a different and basically more rapid evolution. A second type 
of North American H1N1 viruses are reassortants with the surface glycoproteins of this classical 
swine H1N1 virus and internal proteins of more recently emerged H3N2 or H1N2 SIVs. These 
“triple reassortant” viruses are important progenitors of the current novel H1N1 2009 pandemic 
virus, as explained further. It should be noted here that most SIVs are a result of genetic 
reassortment and their genes are composed of human and/or avian and/or swine virus genes. 
Viruses of both other subtypes, H3N2 and H1N2, also have a different history and constitution in 
Europe and in the USA, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this in detail. The 
bottom line is that the epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses in pigs are extremely 
complex and, unlike for human influenza viruses, different in different regions of the world. 
 
 
Influenza pandemics in the 20th century and the presumed role of pigs 
 
In theory, pandemic influenza viruses must have a novel HA subtype to which the human 
population has no immunity, have the capacity to cause serious human disease and, 
importantly, spread efficiently from human to human. The introduction of a novel influenza virus 
in the human population per se is insufficient start a human pandemic, because the virus must 
undergo genetic changes - either by mutation or genetic reassortment - to become adapted to 
efficient replication and transmission in humans. Three influenza pandemics have occurred 
during the 20th century: the Spanish flu (H1N1) of 1918, the Asian flu (H2N2) of 1957 and the 
Hong Kong flu (H3N2) of 1968. 
 
The Spanish influenza pandemic was the most extreme and killed more people, at least 
20 million, than World War I. The first clinical observations of SI were also made at that time and 
investigators were impressed with the clinical and pathological similarities of human and swine 
influenza in 1918. Years thereafter, phylogenetic analyses indicated that the 1918/1919 human 
and swine viruses were genetically similar and likely originated from a common ancestor. The 
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most widely disseminated hypothesis is that the virus jumped from birds to humans shortly 
before the start of the pandemic. But some researchers recently dispute this hypothesis. They 
argue that the virus evolved in people or pigs for an unknown period of time before the 
pandemic started and that it most likely was a reassortant and not a pure avian virus. Because 
of a lack of sequence data for swine and other influenza viruses from these periods, the exact 
origin of the 1918 virus will probably remain controversial and we may never know whether the 
virus first emerged in people or in pigs. 
 
Both the 1957 and 1968 pandemics were caused by reassortants between the 
circulating human influenza virus of that time and an avian virus that provided a novel HA and 
one or 2 other genes. For many years it was believed that the reassortment did not directly 
occur in humans but in pigs, which served as an intermediate host to transfer the viruses to 
humans. The textbooks continue to quote this hypothesis, but there is in fact no direct evidence 
for the role of pigs in the generation of the 1957 or 1968 pandemics. Why then have pigs been 
blamed so often? Much of the hypothesis is based on experimental studies from the 1980s and 
‘90s and on epidemiologic data from that time. One key finding was that reassortants between 
human and avian influenza viruses frequently emerge in pigs. The notion of the pig as a unique 
mixing vessel for these viruses was further supported by the discovery, in 1998, that epithelial 
cells of the pig trachea contain both human- and avian-type receptors. It was also shown that 
continued replication of an avian virus in pigs in nature may lead to variants that preferentially 
recognize human-type receptors and that are thus better adapted for replication in humans. 
Furthermore, infection of humans with influenza viruses from birds appeared to be extremely 
rare in the past, with only 3 reported cases from 1959 to 1996. Influenza viruses derived form 
swine, on the other hand, had been shown to transmit to humans on several occasions since 
the 1950s. All this has led to the central dogma that pigs are uniquely susceptible to both avian 
and human influenza viruses and that they serve as mixing vessels and intermediate hosts for 
the transmission of avian viruses to humans. The next paragraph will clarify why many of these 
older theories have now become outdated. 
 
 
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza: a pandemic scare 
 
Since 2003, outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza have been reported in poultry in many 
different countries on several continents, including Asia, Africa and Europe. These are the 
largest and most devastating outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in history, and 
millions of chickens and ducks have been culled at a high economic cost. A total 467 human 
H5N1 infections have been reported to the World Health Organization from the start of the 
outbreaks in 2003 to December 2009, and 282 of these were fatal. This exceptionally high case-
fatality rate is most likely due to a massive replication of the H5N1 virus in the lungs of humans, 
which results in a “cytokine storm” and acute respiratory distress syndrome. Still, the total 
number of human infections remains small compared to the numbers of infected poultry. Most, if 
not all, of the human cases were in people with close contact with infected poultry and direct 
exposure to large amounts of H5N1 virus, questioning the so popular hypothesis of the pig as 
an intermediate host. Fortunately, the virus has not become adapted for human-to-human 
transmission and this is a major reason why it did not cause a pandemic. 
 
Pigs can and do become infected with H5N1 under natural and experimental conditions, 
but all evidence indicates that the currently circulating H5N1 viruses are not well adapted for 
replication in pigs. The incidence of H5N1 infection in pigs in Asia has remained very low, even 
in areas where the virus remains endemic in poultry. The few available experimental infection 
studies indicate that the H5N1 virus replicates in the respiratory tract of pigs, but to a much 
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lower extent than typical SIVs and mainly in the lungs. Remarkably, the pigs showed only mild 
or no clinical signs, while the viruses were extremely virulent for poultry. Also, the infected pigs 
failed to transmit the virus to uninfected littermates. Unfortunately, all these studies involved 
very few pigs and a limited number of examinations, which is inherent to pig infection 
experiments under biosafety level-3 conditions. 
 
In our lab we have performed a detailed pathogenesis study in pigs with a low 
pathogenic avian influenza virus, subtype H5N2. This virus is structurally very similar to the 
higher mentioned H5N1 viruses, but it is not dangerous for poultry or humans. We compared 
the extent and sites of replication of the avian H5N2 virus with that of an enzootic European 
swine H1N1 virus. Both viruses showed a similar organ tropism and duration of infection: they 
were found in epithelial cells along the entire porcine respiratory tract, and mainly in the lungs, 
for 6 consecutive days after the intranasal inoculation. The avian virus, however, infected 
proportionally fewer cells than the swine virus at all levels of the respiratory tract. As a result of 
this, the nasal cavity, which is a major portal of entry for influenza viruses, appeared to be 
extremely difficult to infect for the avian virus. This finding may explain why pigs apparently 
need exposure to high doses of avian influenza viruses to become infected, why they have 
lower amounts of avian than swine viruses in their nasal secretions after experimental infection, 
and why it is so hard for avian viruses to spread between pigs. 
 
We have also compared the replication capacities of various swine and avian influenza 
viruses in vitro, in porcine respiratory organ cultures. This was combined with detailed studies of 
influenza virus receptor expression along the entire upper and lower respiratory tract, which 
were entirely novel. Like in the pig infection experiments, the avian viruses were strongly 
hampered in their replication, especially in the nose and trachea, but they started to replicate 
better in the bronchioles and lungs. The preference of the avian viruses for the lungs 
corresponded with the expression of influenza virus receptors. The “human” receptor, which is 
also used by SIVs, was found in the upper and lower portions of the airways, the “avian” 
receptor was almost exclusively present in the lungs. In sharp contrast with earlier beliefs, there 
is now agreement that the respiratory tract of humans also contains both types of receptors. The 
avian receptor, however, was only found deep in the lungs, the preferential replication site for 
avian viruses in humans, as in pigs. All this fits with the recent realization that genetic 
reassortment can also occur in humans, and not only in pigs. Simply put: the pig may be less 
unique and more similar to humans than previously thought. Wholly avian viruses are clearly 
hampered in their replication in either pigs or humans. The genetic changes that are required for 
adaptation to mammals may still occur in the pig, but they could just as well take place in 
humans or even some bird species. 
 
 
A new pandemic that is not bird flu: the novel swine-origin influenza virus 
 
While many feared an avian influenza H5N1 pandemic emerging from Asia, the first 
pandemic since 41 years is caused by a swine-origin influenza virus and it started in North 
America. Against all expectations, this novel H1N1 virus belongs to a subtype that has been 
circulating in the human population from 1918 to 1957 and again from 1977 until now. Still the 
novel H1N1 virus differs radically from the human seasonal H1N1 viruses, and it is a reassortant 
of at least 2 circulating SIVs. Six gene segments are similar to ones previously found in triple 
reassortant SIVs circulating in pigs in North America, from which the pandemic virus has 
derived a classical H1 HA. These swine viruses already have a mix of avian, human and swine 
virus genes. The second virus, from which the genes encoding the N1 neuraminidase and 
matrix proteins are derived, is circulating in swine populations in Europe or Asia. 
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It has long been known that SIVs sporadically jump to humans. There are some 70 
documented cases of swine flu in humans since 1958. Almost any of the established North 
American or European SIV genotypes has occasionally been isolated from humans. Most of 
these people had close contact with pigs and the human disease was usually clinically similar to 
disease caused by infections with human influenza viruses. A few cases were fatal, but these 
were mainly in persons with underlying medical conditions. Most important is that all of the SIVs 
so far lacked the critical property to spread further in the human population, and this is a major 
difference with the novel 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus. It will also be clear that the total number of 
proven SIV cases in humans remains small compared to the total number of humans with 
occupational exposure to pigs. Serologic studies, on the other hand, suggest that these few 
documented cases are only the tip of the iceberg. These studies consistently found higher 
seroprevalence rates and higher antibody titers against SIVs in those working with pigs than in 
non-swine-exposed controls. Unfortunately, the interpretation of such studies remains very 
difficult: the elevated antibody titers do not necessarily result from infection with SIVs, because 
of the possibility of partial serologic cross-reactivity between human and swine influenza viruses 
of the same subtype in the serologic assays used. One certainty, therefore, is that the true 
incidence of SI in humans is unknown. 
 
Though the novel 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus almost certainly comes from pigs, it is still 
a mystery how, when and where it originated. Before its detection in humans in the spring of 
2009, this specific virus had never been found in pigs. But there is only limited surveillance for 
influenza in pigs, and the virus has probably been circulating unnoticed in swine somewhere. In 
any case, the novel H1N1 virus was almost certainly absent in European swine populations in 
the past, as the “European Surveillance Network for Influenza in Pigs” that has operated from 
2001 to 2008 has never detected it. Several swine influenza research groups set out to conduct 
experimental pig infection studies with the novel H1N1 virus soon after its swine-origin was a 
fact. These studies unanimously showed that the virus is infectious to pigs and spreads rapidly 
in a pig trial population. The virus seemed to behave almost exactly like the enzootic SIVs. From 
mid May 2009 until this time of writing, occasional cases of the novel H1N1 virus on swine farms 
have been reported in a total 20 countries, including (Northern) Ireland, the UK, Norway, 
Iceland, Finland, Italy, Germany and Denmark. The pigs seem to have become infected by 
infected humans, and there is no evidence so far that swine are playing any role in the 
epidemiology or in the worldwide spread of the virus in the human population. It remains to be 
seen whether the novel H1N1 virus will become established in swine populations. One critical 
question here is whether immunity to enzootic SIVs may protect pigs against this novel virus. 
 
To get a preliminary sense as to whether the European swine population is fully 
susceptible to the novel H1N1 virus, we have examined sera from pigs that had been infected or 
vaccinated with European SIVs. The sera were tested for antibodies against the novel H1N1 
virus, as well as SIVs that have been circulating in North America over the last decade. All these 
viruses have a classical H1 HA that shows very low sequence identity (only 75% or less) with 
the H1 of European SIVs. Pigs that had undergone a single infection with European H1N1 or 
H1N2 SIVs lacked antibodies to the novel H1N1 and North American viruses. In contrast, 
serologic cross-reactivity was common after consecutive infections with 2 different European 
subtypes or after vaccination with commercial vaccines. These serologic data suggest that 
European pigs may have partial immunity to the novel H1N1 virus and that the chances that 
they will become involved in the spread of the virus to humans may be lower than generally 
believed. The next step is to test this assumption in well-controlled experimental challenge 
studies in pigs. 
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No one can predict the evolution of the novel H1N1 virus and the eventual impact of the 
pandemic for humans. So far, the virus is not more virulent for humans than the seasonal 
human influenza viruses and the mortality rate remains low. Another important fact is that there 
may be a certain degree of immunity to the pandemic virus in the human population. The novel 
H1N1 virus is antigenically very different from the contemporary seasonal human H1N1 viruses, 
but it is relatively similar to H1N1 viruses circulating in the human population up until the 1950s. 
This agrees with the finding that a substantial proportion of humans over 60 appear to have 
cross-reactive antibodies to the novel H1N1 virus, and it likely explains why the virus hit the 
young harder than the elderly. This is just one reason why the pandemic has remained relatively 
mild. In addition, specific vaccines against this novel virus have been developed in a very short 
time and they have been used widely in several European countries. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We owe several new insights into the generation of pandemic influenza viruses to the 
outbreaks of H5N1 and to the emergence of the novel 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus. Both viruses 
have taken the edge of some old dogmas about the role of pigs in influenza pandemics. It is 
clearly a myth that pigs are essential intermediate hosts for the transmission of avian influenza 
viruses to humans, that they are the single animal species with both avian- and human-type 
influenza virus receptors, or that genetic reassortment is restricted to the pig. On the other hand, 
it is true that pigs frequently are a platform for reassortment and they can transmit reassortant 
viruses to humans. Though obviously a very rare event, there is a real danger that swine-origin 
reassortants start to spread readily between humans and launch a pandemic, and this is 
perfectly illustrated by the novel H1N1 virus. What we still don’t know is what is needed for 
efficient replication in and adaptation of influenza viruses to pigs. Similarly, it remains unknown 
what factors trigger transmission of influenza viruses from pigs to humans at the physiological 
and molecular level, or what is needed for the further transmission of such viruses between 
humans. These are difficult but extremely important questions that can only be solved through 
research. Combined with improved surveillance for influenza in animals, effective vaccines and 
antivirals, an understanding of these questions is critical to the control of future influenza 
pandemics. 
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